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Abstract
Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inher-
ently unstable. Due to stochastic river ﬂow, agreements may be broken in
case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyse whether water
allocation agreements can be self-enforcing. An agreement is modelled as
the outcome of bargaining game on river water allocation. Given this agree-
ment, the bargaining game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game
in which countries decide whether or not to comply with the agreement.
I assess under what conditions such agreements are self-enforcing, given
stochastic river ﬂow. The results show that, for suciently low discounting,
every ecient agreement can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium.
Requiringrenegotiation-proofnessmayshrinkthesetofpossibleagreements
to a unique self-enforcing agreement. The solution induced by this partic-
ular agreement implements the “downstream incremental distribution”, an
axiomaticsolutiontowaterallocationthatassignsallgainsfromcooperation
to downstream countries.
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11 Introduction
In this paper I analyse an agreement that is based on the outcome of a bargain-
ing game. This game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which
countries decide whether or not to comply with the agreement. The motivating
example for this particular setup are agreements on river water allocation.
In an international river basin, when water is scarce, countries may exchange
water for side payments (Carraro et al., 2007). This type of exchange is generally
formalised in a water allocation agreement. The aim of water allocation agree-
ments is to increase the overall eciency of water use. This increase in eciency
can be obstructed by the stochastic nature of river ﬂow, because countries may
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to break the agreement in case of drought. A recent example is
Mexico’s failure to meet its required average water deliveries under the 1944 US-
Mexico Water Treaty in the years 1992–1997 (Gast´ elum et al., 2009). Additional
case study evidence on agreement breakdowns because of droughts can be found
in Barrett (1994a), Beach et al. (2000), Bernauer (2002), and Siegfried and Bernauer
(2007). Only a minority of current international agreements take into account
the variability of river ﬂow (Giordano and Wolf, 2003; Fischhendler, 2004, 2008).
Most agreements do not; they either allocate ﬁxed or proportional shares, or they
are ambiguous in their schedule for water allocation. Both the eciency (Bennett
et al., 2000) and stability (Ansink and Ruijs, 2008) of such agreements may be
hampered. These eects could be worsened by the impacts of climate change on
river ﬂow (McCarey, 2003; Drieschova et al., 2008).
In order to accommodate for stochastic river ﬂow, Kilgour and Dinar (2001)
developed a ﬂexible water allocation agreement that provides an ecient alloca-
tion for every possible level of river ﬂow. This agreement maximises the overall
beneﬁts of water use, after which side payments are made such that each country
beneﬁts from cooperation. This ﬂexible agreement assures eciency, but not sta-
bilitybecauseitignorestherepeatedinteractionofcountriesovertime. Countries
haveanincentivetodefectfromtheagreementwhenthebeneﬁtsofdefectingout-
weigh the beneﬁts of compliance. Note that there is no supra-national authority
that can enforce this type of international agreements. This implies that a stable
agreement has to be self-enforcing in the sense that both countries should ﬁnd it
in their interest to comply with the agreement (Barrett, 1994b).1 In such a setting,
1Often, the term self-enforcing agreement refers to agreements that satisfy internal and external
stability (Barrett, 1994b). I follow McEvoy and Stranlund (2009) by using the term to refer to the
enforcement of compliance with agreements once they are in place.
2renegotiation-proofness of the agreement is a natural requirement (Bergin and
MacLeod, 1993; Barrett, 2003).
The objective of this paper is to analyse self-enforcing water allocation agree-
ments. Each year, countries decide whether or not to comply with speciﬁed
agreement actions. I assess under what conditions such agreements are self-
enforcing, given stochastic river ﬂow.2 To do so, I construct a two-country re-
peated extensive-form game of river water allocation with stochastic river ﬂow.
Before the start of the ﬁrst stage game, the outcome of a bargaining game de-
termines the agreement speciﬁcations: water allocation and side payments. In
each stage game, as water ﬂows from one country to the other, the countries act
sequentially in using water and making side payments. In doing so, they decide




is required, then for suciently low discounting, every subgame perfect equilib-
rium is renegotiation-proof. For suciently high discounting, however, there is
a unique self-enforcing agreement. This particular agreement implements the
“downstream incremental distribution”, an axiomatic solution to water alloca-
tion constructed by Ambec and Sprumont (2002). The solution induced by this
self-enforcing agreement is ecient and assigns all gains from cooperation to the
downstreamcountry, asdiscussedinsection4. Thisdistributionofthegainsfrom
cooperation contrasts with the assumption in much of the river sharing literature
that being upstream increases a country’s power in the basin (cf. LeMarquand,
1977; Wolf, 1998; Barrett, 2003; Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Carraro et al., 2007).
The results of this paper are driven by the combination of the sequential struc-
ture of the game with the requirement of renegotiation-proofness. The sequential
structure of the game leads to asymmetry in punishment options to deter de-
fection. The bargaining outcome is sensitive to assumptions on this sequential
structure. Thisclariﬁesthatthedistributionofbargainingpowerovertheriparian
countries depends heavily on the design of the agreement.
This paper makes three novel contributions. First, I provide a self-enforcing
2This paper is therefore a contribution to the challenge raised by Carraro et al. (2007): “Water
resources are intrinsically unpredictable, and the wide ﬂuctuations in water availability are likely
to become more severe over the years. Formally addressing the stochasticity of the resource, as
well as the political, social, and strategic feasibility of any allocation scheme, would signiﬁcantly
contribute to decreasing conﬂicts over water.”
3agreement for river water allocation, that is generally applicable to agreements
in repeated extensive-form games. Second, I assess how the bargaining outcome
on agreement speciﬁcations can be aected by the prospect of playing a repeated
extensive-form game in which countries decide to comply or defect from the
agreement. Third, I analyse renegotiation-proofness in repeated games with an
extensive-form stochastic stage game.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, the setting
of the game is presented. In section 3, I show that every ecient agreement can
be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium, but that requiring renegotiation-
proofness may shrink the set of possible agreements to a unique self-enforcing
agreement. In section 4, I describe that this unique self-enforcing agreement
implements the downstream incremental distribution. In section 5, I conclude.
2 Game setting
In this section I describe the setting of the game, including the bargaining game
and the subsequent repeated extensive-form game.
2.1 Model
Consider two countries i = 1;2, that share a river and consider cooperation in
waterallocation. Thecountriesareorderedalongariverwithcountry1upstream
of country 2. This setting is relevant for situations where two countries share a
river or where two adjacent countries share river water, without the participation
of other riparians. An example of the latter situation is the Nile basin where the
Nile Waters Agreement implements water sharing between Egypt and Sudan,
without participation of Ethiopia and the other Nile countries.
Total river ﬂow Qt in year t is drawn from probability distribution f(Qt). The
share of river ﬂow that is added to the river in country i equals Qi;t = iQt, with
i  0 and 1 + 2 = 1. Water use xi;t is constrained by both availability and
unidirectionality of river ﬂow, and by upstream water use:3
0  x1;t  Q1;t; (1)
0  x2;t  Q1;t + Q2;t   x1;t: (2)
3Qt is the river ﬂow that is available for use; it does not include the minimum instream ﬂow
that is necessary to sustain the ecological functions of the river. Furthermore, note that xi;t denotes
water use, not water diversion (that may re-enter the water system as return ﬂows).
4Under a water allocation agreement, countries trade water for side payments,
making both countries better o. Side payments si;t may be monetary or in-kind,
with:
s1;t =  s2;t: (3)
Countries receive payos i;t, deﬁned as the sum of beneﬁts of water use and side
payments:
i;t(xi;t;si;t) = bi(xi;t) + si;t: (4)
Beneﬁt functions bi(xi;t) are increasing and concave with a maximum at ¯ xi.
An allocation plan for a given year t is a triple !t = (Qt;xt;st) with river




, water allocation vector xt = (x1;t;x2;t), and side
payment vector st = (s1;t;s2;t). An allocation plan !t, subject to (1), (2), and (3),
is deﬁned by the actions of the countries. Countries’ have two possible actions:
cooperate (C) or defect (D). When cooperating, countries choose their water use
or side payment based on the speciﬁed agreement actions. When defecting,
countries choose their water use or side payments non-cooperatively. In this
case, no side payments are made, sD
t = (0;0), and the unidirectionality of river






. Given Qt, four allocation plans are possible: the cooperative













and two allocation plans where one country cooperates and the other defects.






















Without this assumption, there would be no need for cooperation between the
two countries. Note that unidirectionality of river ﬂow implies that country 1 can
deliver water to country 2, but not vice versa. Combined, super-additivity and
unidirectionality imply that xC
1;t  xD
1;t and that water is scarce in the sense that:
Q1;t + Q2;t  ¯ x1 + ¯ x2: (6)
2.2 Bargaining game
The outcome of the bargaining game determines the cooperative allocation plan
for each level of river ﬂow. This allocation plan speciﬁes the actions chosen by
countries when they cooperate as discussed in section 2.1.
5In order to determine the cooperative allocation plan, I use the Nash bargain-
ing solution. This solution coincides with the limit case of a non-cooperative
alternating-oers bargaining game which gives strong foundations to its appli-
cation (Binmore et al., 1986). Given beneﬁt functions and a disagreement point,
the Nash bargaining solution provides the cooperative allocation of water and
side payments. Here, the disagreement point equals the payos when both coun-
tries defect. The allocation of water and side payments in year t is such that it






























(1) 0  x1;t  Q1;t












 0 ; i = 1;2;
wherereﬂectsthecountries’bargainingpowerandtheconstraintsarefeasibility
constraints (1) and (2) and individual rationality constraints.4 In absence of
exogenous dierences in bargaining power,  may be endogenously determined
by the game structure in section 3. The Nash bargaining solution provides the






for each level of Qt, used in the water
allocation agreement.
The model setup assures that, given Qt, the Nash bargaining solution max-
imises the joint beneﬁts of water use. Hence, the cooperative water allocation
vector xC
t , induced by the solution, is ecient. Side payments are used to dis-
tribute the gains from cooperation according to the countries’ bargaining power.
Note that for a given level of Qt, there is a unique xC
t that maximises joint beneﬁts
of water use. There are many ecient allocation plans, though, distinguished by
their level of side payments. The Nash bargaining solution selects one of these
ecient allocation plans, depending on the level of . In section 3, we will see
that the prospect of playing the repeated game described in the next subsection
may aect the level of  and hence the side payments speciﬁed in the agreement.
This completes the description of the bargaining game.
4See Houba (2008) for a convex program to implement this type of bargaining solutions for
water allocation problems.
62.3 Repeated game
In a repeated game, the stability aspects of a water allocation agreement can be
analysed. In the repeated extensive-form game that follows the bargaining game,
country 1 is the leader and country 2 the follower, according to the direction of
river ﬂow. Given an agreement, the stage game in year t is played as follows:
1. A value for Qt, which deﬁnes the values for Qi;t, is drawn from probability
distribution f(Qt) and observed by both countries.







it complies with the agreement, country 1 plays x1;t = xC
1;t. If it defects,
country 1 plays x1;t = xD
1;t.
3. Country 2 observes the action played by country 1, which determines the
maximum value of x2, according to (2). Subsequently, country 2 chooses its































































Figure 1: The stage game.
Consequently, in a one-shot game when binding contracts are not feasible, the
game has one subgame perfect equilibrium that yields the defection allocation
plan. When binding contracts are feasible, the analysis of Kilgour and Dinar
(2001) applies: a bargaining game contingent on Qt yields a Pareto-ecient water
allocation vector, with side payments such that the gains from cooperation are
equally shared. When the stage game is repeated and binding contracts are
7feasible, Busch and Wen (1995) have shown that inecient situations may arise,
including delay of the signing of an agreement.
The situation analysed in this paper is dierent. I analyse a non-binding
water allocation agreement that is based on the outcome of a bargaining game,
and subsequent interaction of the countries in a repeated game.
This completes the description of the repeated extensive-form game.
3 Self-enforcing agreements
A self-enforcing water allocation agreement for the repeated extensive-form
game, described in section 2, is a pair of strategies that provides a subgame
perfect and renegotiation-proof equilibrium, as discussed in section 1. In this sec-
tion, using the two games described in section 2, I ﬁrst show that every ecient
water allocation agreement can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium for
suciently low discounting. Subsequently, I show how requiring renegotiation-
proofness aects this result.
3.1 Subgame perfect equilibria
Given a water allocation agreement that is based on the outcome of a bargaining
game, countries decide whether or not to comply with speciﬁed agreement ac-
tions in each stage game of the repeated extensive-form game. In the repeated
game, countries can be punished in case of defection. The decision whether to
comply in year t depends on the net present value (NPV) of the expected payo
stream E(i;t), where i;t = (i;t;i;t+1;i;t+2;:::) is the stream of payos from

















where the last term reﬂects continuation payos, and where  2 [0;1] is the
discount factor. Due to the sequential structure of the game, the NPVs of the
































8and (10). In year t, if country 1 defects by not delivering the agreed upon share
of water, then irrespective of the possible start of a punishment phase, country 2
is free to defect too and so will not make the side payment. In year t, if country 2
defects by not making the side payment, it has already received its cooperative
shareofwater, duetothesequentialstructureofthestagegame. Hence, countries
face dierent incentives to defect from agreement actions. Nevertheless, in both


















. Compliance with the agreement is











Repeating the game gives room for punishment. A standard strategy to
punish defection is to play a minimax strategy for a number of years. If the threat
of punishment is credible and suciently severe, no country has an incentive to
defect from agreement actions and cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium.
This property is generally known as the folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin,
1986). The theorem says that, given any feasible and individually rational payo
vector ? of the stage game, there exists  < 1, such that the repeated game





case of two players. The game in this paper diers from the standard repeated
game in two respects; it features an extensive-form stage game and stochastic
river ﬂow. Appropriate modiﬁcations of the folk theorem have been constructed
for both of these cases, and I brieﬂy discuss these now.
The ﬁrst modiﬁcation concerns repeated games with an extensive-form stage
game. For this type of games, Sorin (1995) shows that the Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986) folk theorem generalises to extensive-form repeated games (see also Ru-
binstein and Wolinsky, 1995). Wen (2002) explains that the only condition for this
generalisation is that the stage game satisﬁes full dimensionality. Full dimension-
ality requires that the dimension of the set of feasible and individually rational
payo vectors equals the number of players (two in this game). This condition
is satisﬁed through the prisoner’s dilemma payo structure of the game. Hence,
the extensive-form stage game does not require modiﬁcation of the Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986) folk theorem.
The second modiﬁcation concerns stochastic games. A stochastic game has
a (ﬁnite) collection of states, in each of which a particular stage game is played.
Dutta(1995)hasshownthatthefolktheoremgeneralisestostochasticgameswhen
9two conditions are satisﬁed. The ﬁrst necessary condition is that the individually
rational set of payos should not vary across histories. This condition is satisﬁed
because the states of the game are determined by Qt and thereby i.i.d. given
the exogenous distribution f(Q). Hence, Qt is independent from Qt 1 and from
countries’previousactions. Thesecondnecessaryconditionisfulldimensionality,
discussed above. Because both conditions are satisﬁed, this folk theorem can
be applied here. The theorem says that given a certain payo vector ? that
dominates the long-run average minimax payos, there exists a ? < 1, such
that the stochastic game has a subgame perfect equilibrium that approximates
the payo vector ? for all  2 (?;1) (Theorem 9 in Dutta, 1995). Note that
because Qt is determined exogenously, the set of payo vectors that dominate
the long-run average minimax payos equals the set of feasible and individually
rational payo vectors.5 This equality implies that for the game in this paper, we
have  = ?. Hence, stochastic river ﬂow does not require modiﬁcation of the
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) folk theorem.
Thefactthatthegameofthispaperfeaturesanextensive-formstagegameand
stochasticity simultaneously is not problematic, because extensive-form games
mayberegardedasaspecialformofstochasticgames(Yoon,2001). Therefore,the
extensive-form stage game and stochastic river ﬂow do not prevent application
of the Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) folk theorem. Consequently, any agreement
that improves upon minimax payos can be sustained in a subgame perfect




. The rationality constraints in the Nash product—
see (7)—imply that the agreement is individually rational. More precisely, the
Nash bargaining solution makes the countries coordinate on ecient equilibria,
so we know that the agreement is ecient. The above discussion is summarised
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Any ecient water allocation agreement can be sustained in a subgame





Consequently, the prospect of playing the repeated game cannot aect the
outcome of the bargaining game for this interval of the discount factor. For lower
values of the discount factor, the agreement cannot be sustained, so countries
may defect in equilibrium. In the next subsection we assess how the requirement
of renegotiation-proofness aects these results.
5This equality does not hold when the transition rule between states depends on countries’
actions or the previous state. This is relevant, for instance, when countries invest in reservoir
capacity to create a buer for drought years.
103.2 Adding renegotiation-proofness
A subgame perfect agreement may only be self-enforcing ex ante, because punish-
ments may not be credible ex post once a value for Qt is drawn from probability
distribution f(Qt). Punishments are not credible when the punishment equilib-
rium is inecient. Then, it is in both countries’ interest to renegotiate out of the
Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Hence, a self-enforcing agreement has to satisfy
renegotiation-proofness. This requirement rules out equilibria where both coun-
triesarehurtbypunishment(BerginandMacLeod,1993;Barrett,2003). Formally,
I use the concept of a “weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium”, which says that
if countries agreed ex ante to play strategy , and if the history of the game im-
pliesthatcontinuationequilibriume conditionalonistobeplayed, theydonot
have a joint incentive to switch instead to another continuation equilibrium e0
of
 (Farrell and Maskin, 1989). In other words, payos at any subgame must not
be dominated by payos at any other subgame. This concept of renegotiation-
proofness is equal to “internal consistency”, used by Bernheim and Ray (1989).
I adapt a punishment strategy suggested by Van Damme (1989) for the
(normal-form) repeated prisoner’s dilemma. He showed that for this game there
exists a punishment strategy, such that any subgame perfect equilibrium of the
repeatedprisoner’sdilemmaisrenegotiation-proof, forsucientlylowdiscount-
ing. This particular punishment strategy is the “penance” strategy. Each country
startswithCandplayscooperativelyaslongastheothercountrydoesso. Ifcoun-
try i plays D in year t, then the punishment phase for i begins. In this punishment
phase, country i plays C and country j plays D, until the ﬁrst time that country i
actually plays C, then country j returns to playing C too (Van Damme, 1989). In
the subgame perfect and renegotiation-proof equilibrium, if a country defects, it
is punished for one period and then the countries revert to the cooperative phase.
This punishment phase is renegotiation-proof because of the particular payo
structure of the prisoner’s dilemma. Equilibria where one country plays C, while
the other plays D are never Pareto-dominated.
This penance strategy can be adapted to the setting of an extensive-form
prisoner’s dilemma with stochastic river ﬂow. In the extensive-form game of this
paper, countries have dierent means of punishing the other country. Country 1
is in control of water delivery to country 2, while country 2 is in control of the
side payment. If country 2 defects, the penance strategy prescribes that (D;C)
11is played in the next p stage games.6 If country 1 defects, however, it can be
punished within the same stage game by country 2 (by playing D), in addition to
the penance strategy of playing (C;D) in the next p stage games. Therefore, under
the penance strategy, country 2 has an additional punishment option compared
with country 1. Note that in the extensive-form game, stage game payos occur
at the end of the stage game. This leads to an additional advantage for country 2:
its additional punishment option is not discounted by country 1.
The implication of this asymmetry in punishment options is that for suf-
ﬁciently low values of , when renegotiation-proofness is required, country 1
cannot punish country 2 upon defection, while country 2 can punish country 1.
This is formally stated in the following lemma.




, there is no
renegotiation-proof punishment to deter defection by country 2, while there is a re-
negotiation-proof punishment to deter defection by country 1.
Proof. The proof is by construction. Consider the penance strategy described
above.













































Given the individual rationality constraint in (7), the LHS of this inequality is
non-negative for admissible values of  while the RHS is non-positive. Hence,
defection by country 1 is deterred for any value of .
Given Qt, the immediate gain in payos of defection in year t to country 2,
using (8) and (10), equals  sC
2;t. The total value of the punishment (in the next




































6Van Damme (1989) did not need a multi-period punishment to demonstrate renegotiation-
proofness in the normal-form repeated game. Here, it is useful as it increases the severity of
punishments.
12Given super-additivity and the concavity of the beneﬁt function, both the LHS
andtheRHSof thisinequalityarenon-negative. Itiseasy toverifythatthereexist
parameter combinations for which the inequality is violated. For  = , (12) holds
with equality. 




, country 2 can defect in every single
year, without being punished. Obviously, this asymmetry in punishment options
may aect the outcome of the bargaining game. When country 1 cannot punish
country 2 upon defection, this implies that country 2 can always defect. Hence,
country 2 has all bargaining power in the bargaining game that determines the
agreement. In terms of the Nash bargaining solution in (7),  = 0. The resulting
agreement assigns all the gains from cooperation to country 2, leaving coun-
try 1 indierent between C and D. Any other (ecient) agreement would be
susceptible to defection by country 2. Consequently, country 1 receives its min-
imax payo, exactly compensating country 1 for sustaining the ecient water
allocation vector.
Recall that a self-enforcing water allocation agreements is a pair of strate-
gies that provides a subgame perfect and renegotiation-proof equilibrium. From















, only those agreements where all gains
from cooperation go to country 2 are self-enforcing, as discussed above.7
The above discussion is summarised in the following proposition that forms
the main result of this paper.




, any subgame perfect water allocation agreement is self-




, the unique self-enforcing agreement assigns all the gains from
cooperation to the downstream country.
The payo distribution for this unique self-enforcing agreement is indicated
by S in the stylised payo space presented in ﬁgure 2. In this ﬁgure, the solution
found by Kilgour and Dinar (2001) is indicated by KD; this solution assumes
 = 1
2 which yields the “midpoint of the contract-curve”.
The asymmetry in punishment options is driving the extreme allocation plan




. This asymmetry is a result
7Note that  may be smaller or larger than . When    < , it follows logically that the

















Figure 2: A stylised payo space; the thick line denotes the set of possible payos
for ecient agreements that can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium;
M denotes minimax payos (i.e. payos under the defection allocation plan);





KD denotes the payos for the Kilgour and Dinar (2001) solution.
of the speciﬁc sequential structure of the stage game in which it is assumed that
side payments are made after water is delivered. Given the unidirectional ﬂow
of water, this seems the most natural structure of the stage game. This structure
can, however, be modiﬁed in the following two ways. First, water deliveries and
payments could be made in shorter intervals (e.g. monthly instead of yearly),
while retaining the same sequential structure of the stage game. This change
would increase the values of  and , but this does not aect the qualitative
outcome of proposition 2. Depending on parameter values it may, however,
shrink or expand the interval of values of  for which renegotiation-proofness
holds. Second, the sequential structure could be reversed such that ﬁrst the side
paymentismadeandonlythenwaterisdelivered. Thischangewouldcompletely
reverse the asymmetry in punishment options, causing all bargaining power to
be with country 1 (i.e.  = 1).
Clearly, thesolutioninducedbyaself-enforcingagreementisverysensitiveto
14boththesequenceofwaterdeliveriesandsidepayments(asspeciﬁedinthewater
allocation agreement), and the level of discounting. Using the sequence of the
stagegamedescribedinsection2yieldsoneoftwooutcomes. Forsucientlylow
discounting, anyself-enforcingagreementmayresultoutofthebargaininggame,
depending on the exogenous distribution of bargaining power. For suciently
highdiscounting,auniqueself-enforcingagreementassignsallbargainingpower,
and hence all gains from cooperation to the downstream country. This outcome
is in contrast with much of the river sharing literature in which it is assumed that
being upstream increases a country’s power in the basin. Nevertheless, it is in
line with recent literature that suggests that factors other than geography play
a key role in determining bargaining power and water allocation patterns in a
river basin (Dinar, 2006; Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Zawahri, 2008; Ansink and
Weikard, 2009).
4 The downstream incremental distribution
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) developed an axiomatic solution to water sharing,
which assures that each country receives a welfare level between a lower and
an upper bound. The lower bound is the welfare a country could achieve if all
countries make unilateral, non-cooperative, decisions on water use. This bound
is based on the principle of “absolute territorial sovereignty” and is similar to the
defection allocation plan of this paper. The upper bound is the welfare a country
couldachieveifupstreamcountriesrefrainfromusingwater. Thisboundisbased
on the principle of “absolute territorial integrity”. A compromise of these two
conﬂicting principles, where each country is guaranteed its lower bound and
aspires its upper bound, yields a unique solution. This solution allocates water
such that each country’s welfare equals its marginal contribution to a coalition
composed of its upstream neighbours. Ambec and Sprumont (2002) call this
solution the “downstream incremental distribution”.
For the case of two countries, the water allocation vector induced by the
downstream incremental distribution is such that it assigns all the gains from
cooperation to the downstream country (Houba, 2008). Given proposition 2, this





distribution of payos induced by the self-enforcing agreement corresponds to
the two-country case of the downstream incremental distribution.
An alternative implementation of the downstream incremental distribution is
15provided by Ambec and Ehlers (2008). They propose negotiation rules to imple-
ment this distribution in a static setting, in which priority is given “lexicograph-
ically to the most downstream user”. Given a set of players f1;2;:::;kg, player k
proposes an allocation plan to the other players. If all accept, this allocation plan
is implemented. If any player declines the proposed allocation plan, player k
receives xD
k;t = Qk;t and sD
k;t = 0, and player k   1 proposes an allocation plan, etc.
Ambec and Ehlers (2008) show that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of
this game implements the downstream incremental distribution.
The Ambec and Ehlers (2008) game, however, assigns all bargaining power
exogenously to player k by giving him the advantage of making the ﬁrst pro-
posal. No explanation is provided as to why this is a correct approach. This
weakness has been noticed by Van den Brink et al. (2007) and Houba (2008)
who, based on this assumption that downstream countries have all bargaining
power, found the downstream incremental distribution unconvincing (see also
Khmelnitskaya, 2009). In the game described in sections 2 and 3 of this paper, the
distribution of bargaining power follows endogenously from the repeated game
setting of the model and the sequential structure of the stage game. This dynamic
setting provides a more realistic approach for non-cooperative bargaining on wa-
ter allocation than those provided by static models. Clearly, implementation of
the downstream incremental distribution is more convincing when the dynamic
setting is considered in which water allocation agreements are situated. This
implementation adds signiﬁcant credibility to the axiomatic solution developed
by Ambec and Sprumont (2002).
5 Conclusion
In the setting of this paper, any ecient agreement can be sustained in a sub-
game perfect equilibrium for suciently low discounting. The requirement of
renegotiation-proofness is satisﬁed for suciently low discounting too. For suf-
ﬁciently high discounting, however, there is a unique self-enforcing agreement.
This is the agreement that assigns all bargaining power and all gains from co-
operation to the downstream country, and thereby implements the downstream
incremental distribution.
I have used a non-cooperative approach to analyse the allocation of water in
international river basins. Related approaches have been applied to open-access
ﬁsheries (Polasky et al., 2006), transboundary wildlife management (Bhat and
16Huaker, 2007), and international pollution (Germain et al., 2009). Analysis of
this topic using cooperative game theory is the subject of Dinar et al. (2006) and
Beard and MacDonald (2007). The non-cooperative approach comes closest to
actual negotiations on river water allocation. In many current agreements, the
allocation of water is—at least to some extent—based on average river ﬂow. This
is an important reason for the instability of such agreements (cf. Drieschova et al.,
2008).
Kilgour and Dinar (2001) argued for a ﬂexible agreement that adapts to avail-
able river ﬂow. I have developed their approach one step further by accounting
for countries’ incentives to break the agreement. For suciently low discounting,
this paper shows that any ecient water allocation agreement is self-enforcing.
In other words, these agreements are stable. This result supports the approach
by Kilgour and Dinar (2001), because given that ﬂexible agreements are ecient,
they are stable too. This type of agreement is therefore preferable over conven-
tional agreements such as proportional allocations and ﬁxed ﬂow allocations,
which are not ecient and unstable (Ansink and Ruijs, 2008). A related advan-
tage of the self-enforcing agreement is that by oering stability, it can withstand
de-stabilising eects of, for instance, climate change. Apossible impact of climate
change is an increased frequency of years with low river ﬂow. Because the self-
enforcing agreement has water allocation and side payments contingent on river
ﬂow, the agreement does not need to be reconsidered when these impacts occur.
Basedontheresultsofthispaper,arecommendationforcountriesthatmeetto
negotiate the allocation of river water is to explicitly account for stability issues in
their negotiations. Ideally, a water allocation agreement speciﬁes (i) the sequence
of water deliveries and side payments, (ii) the water allocation vector and side
payments contingent on river ﬂow, and (iii) an appropriate punishment strategy
based on the penance strategy outlined in section 3.2. Such an agreement is
self-enforcing for suciently low discounting, and always more stable than any
alternative agreement.
Although most water allocation agreements are bilateral, it seems straight-
forward to extend the analysis of this paper to cover multilateral agreements.
Intuitively, the main results of this paper would not be aected by adding more
countries, implying that any ecient multilateral agreement is self-enforcing for
suciently low discounting. Diculties may arise, however, when the distribu-
tion of river ﬂow (i.e. the parameters i) is such that a certain country cannot be
minimaxed. As a result, full dimensionality may not hold, so that the folk theo-
17rem does not carry over to the multilateral case. Such an extension is, however,
left for future research.
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